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The physical and economic impact of bushfires has been well documented, 
particularly in the United States of America. A National Interagency Fire 
Centre (NIFC, 2003) report revealed that in 2002, more than 88,450 
recorded fires burned 6.9 million acres and 2,381 structures, and the total 
suppression cost for the federal agencies reached $US1.6 billion. Figures for 
preceding years are similar, but suggest that these impacts from bushfire are 
growing in magnitude. Similar bushfire impacts have been recorded in 
Australia. The Ash Wednesday bushfires of 16 January 1983 are perhaps the 
most renowned in Australian history, and the following statistics suggest 
why: in Victoria and South Australia 76 people died; 2,463 houses were 
destroyed; and 360,000 hectares of land was burned (Ramsay & Rudolph, 
2003), total property loss were estimated to be over $A400 million (Willis, 
2004). The January 2003 bushfires, in New South Wales, Victoria and South 
Australia, rivalled Ash Wednesday in terms of widespread destruction and 
property loss (Gilbert, 2004), where four lives were lost, over 500 homes 
destroyed and total damage cost more than $A3oo million (Willis, 2004). 
The 2003 fires were also a harsh reminder of how susceptible Australia is to 
bushfire. In a global context, Australia is widely regarded as the most fire-
prone country (Rohrmann, 1999; Gilbert, 2004). Furthermore, the situation 
may be worsening due to long-term droughts and higher average 
temperatures (Whittaker & Mercer, 2004). 
Loss oflife and property, and the economic costs associated with suppressing 
fires and recovering from fire, are significant and obvious outcomes of 
bushfire, however there are many other impacts and costs of bushfire which 
are often not anticipated because they are more indirect and therefore not as 
obvious to the general public. These include social and economic costs to the 
individual, family and community such as the loss of livelilioods, 
interruption of life patterns and relationships, and in some cases the entire 
social fabric that defines a population as a community can be severely 
weakened (David, Baish & Hearn Morrow, 1999). 
Because fire is, in general terms, a natural ecosystem process (Beringer, 
2000), it is a hazard or a disaster only when human life and property become 
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threatened or destroyed; "The disaster itself occurs within society and not 
within nature" (Weichselgartner, 2001: 86). Indeed, in many areas of 
Australia and the world that have evolved with fire, bushfire plays a positive 
and sometimes crucial role for native vegetation and animals, which depend 
on fire for regeneration, refuge, protection and reproduction (Beringer, 
2000; Haswell & Brown, 2002). Accordingly, the climate, vegetation type 
and existence of ignition sources characteristic of these areas are compatible 
with fire and thus indicate that fire is inevitable (McGee & Russell, 2003). 
In many countries, including Australia, there is a growing pattern of 
population movement into peri-urban areas (Hugo, 2002). These areas tend 
to be bush fire prone and because of the resultant, ever-increasing mix of 
people, property and bushfire Oeading to the potential consequences of 
physical, economic and social impacts described above) bushfire is now a 
significant hazard (McCaffrey, 2004). 
The peri-urban area and bushfire risk 
Cottrell (2005) summarised a number of terms used to describe the peri-
urban area, these include the wildland-urban interface, rural-urban fringe 
and exurban, for example. The peri-urban area includes the extension of 
urban areas into rural areas and regional urban areas. There are many types 
(see Cottrell, 2005), however all peri-urban areas are typically areas where 
structures (whether residential, industrial, recreational, or agricultural) are 
located adjacent to or among combustible wildland fuel (CFS, 2004). There 
are many reasons why people are moving into peri-urban areas, a commonly 
cited reason is the attraction to rural areas because of the associated 
aesthetics of the landscape; other reasons include cheaper house prices and 
reduced crime, pollution and crowding (Monroe, Bowers & Hermansen, 
2003a). In essence these are quality oflife issues. 
However, with the potential benefits of living in the peri-urban area come 
potential costs. The peri-urban area is the most fire vulnerable due to 
mixture of bushland, houses, people, paddocks and stock (Haswell & Brown, 
2002). The fire risk exposure has indeed grown significantly over the last 
several decades (McKee, Berrens, Jones, Helton & Talberth, 2004) and is 
expected to increase as peri-urban populations grow (Gardner, Cortner & 
Widaman, 1987). Furthermore, it has become quite clear that many 
bushfires cannot be fully controlled resulting in serious economic, social and 
ecological damage, as demonstrated by the previously mentioned statistics. 
Therefore, people living in peri-urban areas are exposed to a significant level 
of risk from bushfire and its consequences. 
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Reducing the risk 
. Traditionally risk reduction strategies have been the responsibility of the 
government and its agencies, and have included fire suppression, fire 
prevention through reducing fuel loads and building firebreaks, building 
codes and zoning (the latter two however have not been implemented to such 
an extent, and not necessarily with other strategies, to significantly reduce 
the bushfire risk). More recently there has been a redistribution of rights and 
obligations and/or changes in the allocation of costs and benefits from the 
government to the public (Winter & Fried, 2000). For example, educational 
messages are commonly disseminated to the public to encourage individual 
fire prevention efforts (e.g., create a defensible space around the home by 
clearing vegetation), ordinances have been imposed requiring individuals to 
fireproof their homes (e.g., retrofitting roofs) or to pay tax on additional fire 
protection, and homeowners are often motivated themselves to take 
preventative measures voluntarily and/ or engage in community programs to 
reduce the fire risk to themselves and their neighbourhood (Winter & Fried, 
2000; McKee, Berrens, Jones & Talberth, 2004). 
Given that bushfires are often uncontrollable and fire-fighting and other 
emergency services and resources become so overwhelmed that it is 
impossible to provide people and property with adequate protection, people 
need to take some responsibility to protect themselves and their property. 
However, there is considerable empirical evidence that households in areas 
prone to natural hazards risk under-invest in protective measures (McKee et 
al., 2004). Government intervention has often been unsuccessful due to lack 
of enforcement of ordinances, lack of support from the public or opposition 
to fire prevention strategies, and the public have often been unmotivated to 
take action themselves due to a lack of incentives or a lack of understanding 
of the risk (Winter & Fried, 2000; McKee et aI., 2004). 
There are no guides to 'best practise' for community safety, not one strategy 
or combination of strategies are necessarily successful, nor have been 
adequately successful as discussed above. Therefore bushfire in the peri-
urban areas has become a major, often contentious, issue, and mitigating the 
risk and reducing the impact of bushfire is a problematic and complex 
challenge, but one that requires urgent attention. In addressing the 
challenge, input from the community at risk is important, if not crucial. 
Policies and management strategies should reflect what people expect or at 
least will accept. But what do people expect? Intuitively, people do not want 
to lose their lives or house to bushfire or suffer any other consequences of 
bushfire, but do they perceive the risk? Do they actually expect a significant 
impact? And in terms of protection and resilience, what do they expect of 
themselves? What do they expect of the fire service? What do they expect of 
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the government? To answer these such questions, this paper will review the 
literature to gain a better understanding of people's knowledge, perceptions 
attitudes and expectations in relation to bushfire. ' 
The peri-urban community 
The term community can have a wide range of meanings. A community is a 
group that has a number of things in common, which may be defined by 
location, interests, or function for example. A person can belong to a number 
of different communities, and there can be a number of different 
communities within a single location. Furthermore communities are not 
static with changing membership, ideologies or beliefs, for example 
(Boughton, 1998; Marsh, 2001; Cottrell, 2005). Defining and typifying 
communities in a location, and their members, is therefore a complex, if not 
impossible, task, and thls may be especially so in peri-urban areas where 
there is substantial mixing of rural and urban community characteristics. 
There are a number of possible factors influencing the diversity of peri-urban 
communities. Perhaps the most obvious is the composition of communities. 
Along with long-term residents, there is an influx of people from urban areas 
which indicates a high proportion of newcomers with urban rather than rural 
backgrounds, and due to the attraction of the beauty of the rural landscape, 
there is also a number of weekend and seasonal residents, and 
holidaymakers. Therefore, substantial differences both within and between 
peri-urban areas may be observed in terms of demographics and 
socioeconomic status, life experiences, knowledge, attitudes, opinions, 
perceptions and expectations, for example. Furthermore, Jakes et al. (2002) 
also highlighted differences in social capital, human capital and cultural 
capital between locations within peri-urban areas. Such differences can have 
a significant bearing on bushfire management, and community preparedness 
and resilience, and further highlights the issues for fire policies and services. 
For example, Brunson and Shindler (2004) argue against the "one-size-fits-
all" policies and strategies (about fuels management). They found differences 
between respondent knowledge and acceptability judgements of wildland 
fuels management, which was associated with location-specific social and 
environmental factors as well as individual beliefs 
Bushfire awareness and risk perception 
Until recently, bushfire has not been perceived as a significant hazard 
(McCaffrey, 2004). Perhaps because throughout history (uulike other 
hazards) fire was depended on for warmth, cooking, and to heat water (De 
Cicco, 1990), and complete fire suppression was successful until only the last 
few decades. Today it is clear that bushfire is in fact a significant hazard, and 
218 
growing numbers of people are at risk. Risk however is a complex concept, 
but Meacham (2004) has provided a broad definition: 
[Risk is] the possibility of an unwanted outcome in an uncertain 
situation, where the possibility of the unwanted outcome is a function 
of three factors: loss or harm to something that is valued 
(consequence), the event or hazard that may occasion the loss or harm 
(scenario), and a judgement about the likelihood that the loss or harm 
will occur (probability) (p. 204). 
Assessing risk involves both judging the likely occurrence of an event and the 
likely damage that will be incurred, thus risk perception can be extremely 
subjective, especially in regards to bushfire risk (McCaffrey, 2004). There is 
evidence that risk is perceived differently by experts and non-experts; 
"experts" tend to base their perception of risk on statistics, however risk 
perception for lay people is much more complex. Therefore, in addressing 
risk issues, it is important to understand the risk perception of those at risk 
to move beyond a purely statistical approach (Meacham, 2004). 
Lupton and Tulloch (2002) conduced interviews with a group of Australians 
to gain a better understanding of the ways in which a range of risks are 
understood and dealt with by lay people, and how their risk knowledges are 
constructed and maintained or transformed. They found that risk was 
defined differently by different interviewees, but the major discourses 
centred around "the notion of risk as negative, frightening, involving taking a 
step into the unknown but also a degree of rational judgement and choice on 
the part of the individual concerning whether or not to take this step" 
(Lupton & Tulloch, 2002, p. 331). The interviewees own position in the life 
course, their gender, age, sexual identity, class and so on phrased the risks to 
which people felt they were exposed. Risk was seen as a part of life and also 
strongly tied to an individual's life situation, which both exposed them to 
certain risk and influenced the ways in which they viewed phenomena as 
risks or not. Many described a life course trajectory of risk-taking and risk-
avoidance involving risk-taking when young, avoiding voluntary risk-taking 
when responsibilities such as falnily were important, and some reported 
increased risk-taking again in later years when responsibilities lessened. Few 
people avoided risk-taking altogether, in fact many argued for the 
importance of deliberately taking risks. 
In Lupton and Tulloch's (2002) study, bushfire was not perceived as a risk to 
the interviewees themselves nor as a risk to fellow Australians, which is not 
surprising given that the study was not limited to any particular type of risk, 
and interviewees were not necessarily at risk of bushfire. However, it was 
noted that environmental problems in general were not identified as major 
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risks by the majority of interviewees. Although "environmental problems" 
encompasses a wide range of potential risks, it does include natural hazards 
such as cyclones and floods, as well as bushfire, the risk to which many 
Australians are exposed. One possible explanation is that perceived risks (to 
Australians) were closely tied to current issues receiving extensive media 
attention and public debate at the time of study. Perhaps if the study were 
undertaken after the 2003 bushfires, which received plenty of media 
attention and public debate, bushfires may have been identified by 
interviewees as a risk facing fellow Australians. However, there is evidence 
that people, even those directly exposed to the risk, simply underestimate the 
risk of natural hazards (Cunniugham & Kelly, n.d.). 
Gaps between individual and community perception of risk and the objective 
data on the magnitude, frequency and consequences of the hazard can be 
influenced by a number of issues. Natural hazards, including bushfire, are 
relatively infrequent and not part of everyday life for a given individual or 
community, and are thus easily forgotten. Information on the nature of the 
hazard may be incomplete or ambiguous. In the absence of information, risk 
estimates are based on little data. Acknowledging the risk may bring about 
an uncomfortable psychological state, and coupled with the inherent 
uncertainty of hazards, individuals may resort to various mental strategies 
including denying the risk (e.g., "it won't happen to me"), or giving in-place 
adjustments (e.g., fire suppression) the power of complete rather than partial 
protection, or reasoning that if an event happened recently it won't occur 
again in the near future (Cunningham & Kelly, n.d.; Kumagai, Carroll & 
Cohn, 2004a; McCaffrey, 2004). Furthermore, "dread risk", "unknown risk" 
and number of people exposed have been found to influence the gap in risk 
perception and actual risk. Bushfire fails to score high in this instance also; 
in some cases bushfire evokes little dread due to a feeling of control by 
agencies undertaking suppression of fires. McCaffrey (2004) argues that in 
Canada the extent of bushfire is reasonably limited and there are few 
fatalities, particularly in more recent times; bushfire and its effects are well-
known; and few people are exposed due to adequate warning for evacuation. 
Individual risk perception can also be shaped by the community in which the 
individual lives. Risk perceptions are filtered by community influences such 
as shared experience and existing power relationships, and a cohesive 
community will continually shape and mould their collective perceptions of 
problems (Flint & Luloff, 2005). Gough (2000) inferred from her study that 
community structure and cohesiveness is linked to a better understanding 
and acceptance of natural hazard risk. 
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Vulnerability and Risk 
Vuluerability is inextricably linked with risk. Vulnerability describes the 
degree of susceptibility to harm of those at risk (Young, 1998). Vulnerability, 
in terms of natural hazards, is obviously influenced by geography; a person 
living in a fire-prone area is thus vulnerable to the effects of bushfire. 
However, how vulnerable a person is can be influenced by socioeconomic 
characteristics and other cbaracteristics of the individual, knowledge and 
experience of the hazard, and also the community in which a person lives in 
terms of social structures, community cohesiveness and support, and the 
structural environment in terms of infrastructure (young, 1998; Anderson-
Berry, 2003). Vulnerability can also be detennined by a person's perception 
of risk; a person who underestimates the level of risk will likely expose 
themselves to the risk to a greater extent than a person with more realistic 
perceptions thereby becoming more vulnerable (Anderson-Berry, 2003). 
Vulnerability however, similarly to risk, is not always perceived realistically. 
People with adequate threat knowledge and risk perception do not always 
perceive their own susceptibility to the threat, and furthermore often 
perceive that, in the event of a hazard, that they would be resilient and 
recover quickly (Odgers, 2002). For example, when a person has experienced 
a minor hazard, or even survived a disaster, they may infer from their ability 
to cope in that instance the ability to cope with any future occurrence of the 
hazard, or assume that a future occurrence will not exercise an adverse 
influence on them (normalisation bias). In addition, people often simply rate 
themselves less vulnerable, and more skilful than average (optimistic bias) 
(Johnston, Bebbington, Lai, Houghton & Paton, 1999; Kumagai, Carroll & 
Cohn, 2004a). Also, a person who has taken a step to reduce the risk of their 
house burning (e.g., created defensible space around their home) may be 
overconfident thus underestimating their vulnerability (a whole snite of 
strategies may need to be employed to significantly reduce the risk) (Montz, 
1993)· 
In view of the above discussion, the perceived risk of a natural hazard and 
vulnerability of those at risk to the hazard is distorted primarily by ignorance 
and non-comprehension of the hazard. However, people are not entirely 
unaware of the risks and often do have a good understanding of the risk as 
well as their own vulnerability but chose to accept or tolerate it. According to 
Handmer and Penning-Roswell (1990) (in Gilbert, 2004), the perceived 
probability of a natural hazard is not ouly distorted by ignorance and non-
comprehension, but by recognisable and tangible benefits of the non-hazard 
experience, and by the existence of family and friends nearby (Le., awareness 
of a sense of community). Intimately, people balance the perceived risk and 
the benefit of living in a particular area: the higher the perceived benefit, the 
greater the risk tolerance (McCaffrey, 2004)· 
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Understanding the risk perceptions and vulnerability of communities in 
hazardous areas is important for a number of reasons. Perception of risk and 
vulnerability can be extremely subjective, and peri-urban communities in 
particular may have diverse levels of risk perception, in contrast with other 
areas, because of a diversity of people living in peri-urban areas. Risk 
perception has been linked to preparedness; at least in theory, a person who 
perceives a high risk is more likely to act to reduce exposure than a person 
who perceives low risk (Beringer, 2000; Odgers & Rhodes, 2002; Anderson-
Berry, 2003; McCaffrey, 2004). Furthermore, level of risk perception has 
been found to be influenced (to a variable extent) by awareness-raising 
programs (Rohrmann, 2000ab; Anderson-Berry, 2003). Therefore, in 
understanding the risk perceptions of people in a community and how they 
may be influenced, and identifying those who are particularly vulnerable, a 
community-based approach can be incorporated, which increases the 
adaptability of community safety policies, strategies and programs 
addressing risk issues to the uniqueness of the situation as required. 
Additionally, because people will accept or tolerate risk to a certain degree, 
an understanding of risk perceptions of the community at hand and the 
factors which distort perceptions can determine an acceptable level of risk on 
which policies, strategies and programs may be based. 
As would be expected from the discussion of communities and risk 
perception thus far, a variation in levels of inter- and intra-community risk 
perception would not be surprising. Research into peri-urban resident's 
perception of bushfire risk has indeed revealed that there are considerable 
variations. For example, Monroe and Nelson (2004) found that a large 
majority (84%) of sampled homeowners in Minnesota and F10rida were very 
aware of their risk of wildfire, McGee and Russell (2003) reported that 
almost all respondents (90%) in a Victorian community adequately 
perceived the risk of bushfire, and Beringer (2000) compared two 
communities in Victoria and found that about half (52%) of the residents in 
one community and less than half (36%) in the other were aware of the high 
bushfire risk in their area. 
Perception of Risk Levels 
In McGee and Russell's (2003) study, the high level of risk perception of 
many of the respondents, and a good knowledge of bushfire, can be 
attributed to past bushfire experience and a close association with the local 
fire brigade. Furthermore, the cohesiveness of the community appears to 
have lead to similar realistic perceptions of risk of other community 
members who do not have the same direct experience with fire and have not 
been as involved with the fire brigade. Unfortunately this community is more 
of a 'model' community rather than a community representative of peri-
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urban communities. Not all peri-urban communities are as cohesive, which 
will be explored further in following sections, or as involved with the local 
fire brigade. This community has more rural than urban characteristics and 
is very cohesive. The authors did mention that there was some degree of 
separation between established farm-families and people living on smaller 
blocks, particularly newcomers, but high levels of risk perception were being 
maintained through contact between newcomers and the fire brigade, 
initiated by the fire brigade. Perhaps this community is more representative 
of a process where community cohesion and the existing social, human and 
cultural capital is sufficiently strong to maintain the bushfire risk perception. 
Although this was not addressed by McGee and Russell (2003), a number of 
authors have linked risk perception with level of community cohesion in 
growing peri-urban areas (Anderson-Berry, 2003). For example, Gilbert 
(2004) observed "the diminishing importance of community [in a Victorian 
peri-urban areal with increasing numbers of new arrivals to the area" (p. 
40), and found spatial differences in risk perception that were tied to 
community cohesion: people living iu the more established and community 
oriented streets were far more aware of the bushfire risk than people in 
newer areas, 
Beringer (2000) also observed significant differences in bushfire risk 
perception between newcomers and long-term residents in his study. He 
explained that new residents cannot identify their level of exposure to risk 
until they assess the hazards to which they are exposed. He attributed a 
delayed assessment of the hazard to the reluctance of some people to believe 
in the reality of a threat, and the interval between moving to the area and 
receiving bushfire literature from the fire brigade. Information programs 
have indeed been linked with increased awareness of bushfire risk 
(Rohrmann, 2000ab; Anderson-Berry, 2003) . However results from 
assessments into the effectiveness of such programs are inconsistent. 
Providing information on bushfire risk is not a straightforward process and 
there is not one type of material or method that is consistently successful in 
raising awareness of risk, and information sources are further subject to a 
person's biases and preconceptions (McCaffrey, 2004). In any case, 
newcomers to peri-urban areas appear to become more aware of the bushfire 
risk over time, and the higher the initial awareness the more aware a person 
will be with time, leading to a high perception of risk (Gardner, Cortner & 
Widaman, 1987). Therefore the initial period of residency of newcomers to 
peri-urban areas is an important time for developing perceptions of bush fire 
risk, and low awareness can correspond with the time of the year that the 
home is purchased (Cortner, Gardner & Taylor, 1990). In the non-bushfire 
season, the bushfire risk is not always obvious because of the deceptive 
appearance of the landscape, and bushfire would not be a current issue 
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leading to a possible lack of education and social information indicating the 
bushfire risk. Additionally, the acceptance of risk depends on the degree of 
confidence placed in the organisation charged with its management (Smith, 
2001 in Gilbert, 2004). For example, distrust in a government may mean 
that any information received through that government is disregarded thus 
having no impact on risk perception. There appears to be a greater trust in 
community-based organisations, such as the local fire brigade and their 
community schemes, than governmental organisations (Gilbert, 2004). 
Gardner et al. (1987) investigated newcomers' perception of risk over time 
and found that 6% of respondents surveyed in two Californian communities 
perceived the fire situation to be very serious at the tinle they bought their 
house. At the time of the survey the proportion of homeowners perceiving a 
serious risk had increased to 27%. These results may reflect newcomers 
growing connection with the existing community and an increased share in 
the communities' social, human and cultural capital over time or the 
exposure of respondents to fire information and brigade personal, for 
example. Gardner et al. (1987) mentioned that increased awareness of 
bushfires in their particular study was due to respondents witnessing recent 
bushfires in the area or obtaining information on these bushfires from media 
coverage. Many studies have reported that respondents with past personal 
experience of bushfire have a significantly higher awareness of the risk of 
bushfire than those with no experience (Blanchard & Ryan, 2004; McGee & 
Russell, 2003; Gilbert, 2004). Winter & Fried (2000) stated that direct and 
indirect (e.g., via accounts from neighbours, friends and mass media) 
experiences with wildfire are more influential in perception formation and 
reinforcement than the hazard information received by homeowners in their 
study. 
Gardner et al. (1987) also compared risk awareness and perception of risk of 
people in a fire-affected community and in a non-affected community. They 
interestingly found that risk awareness in the community that was affected 
by the bushfire tended to remain low, the non-affected community felt more 
aware of the danger of bushfire in their neighbourhood. Furthermore, 
respondents from the affected community assigned a much lower probability 
of future fire than the non-affected community. The authors suggested that 
there was a dampening effect on awareness levels and risk perception in the 
fire-affected community. The respondents may have based their assessment 
on the adage that lighting does not strike twice in the same place, or on the 
assumption that the recent fire has reduced the vulnerability of the 
landscape to another fire. Jacobson, Monroe and Marynowski (2001) also 
suggested that experience with bushfire reduces the perception of risk, but 
the type of experience had different effects. The authors found that 
experience with bushfire smoke was correlated with increased awareness and 
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interest in learning more about fire management, perhaps because it 
reminded individuals about fire without generating great fear. McCaffrey 
(2004) also agreed that indirect experiences with wildfire are more 
influential than direct experiences on risk awareness and perceptions. 
However, she commented that perceptions based on a single experience are 
limited and biased, but on the other hand repeated experiences can lead to a 
"disaster subculture" where people become used to the hazard and do not 
perceive it to be a great risk. Experience with a natural hazard and its effect 
on risk perceptions therefore appears to be rather inconsistent. 
Without reinforcement of risk perceptions such as the reoccurrence of fire or 
reception of bushfire information, risk perception may change over time. 
Cunningham and Kelly (n.d.) investigated bushfire perception levels and 
changes in knowledge over time. They surveyed households in 1993 and 
2001 in a New South Wales peri-urban community that was affected by fire 
in 1985. In 1993, all (100%) households that had experienced fire understood 
the high fire risk in their area, in 2001 only 58% understood the fire risk 
suggesting a clear attrition in individual perception of risk. Similarly, 
knowledge about bushfire history decreased between surveys. As time 
progresses from the fire incident and people recover from the impact and 
return to their normal lives, the memory tends to fade and other issues begin 
to take priority. In the same study, the community (including those who had 
and had not experienced the fire) in 1993 had a good understanding (70%) of 
the high fire risk in their street with 33% of households having experienced 
the fire. In 2001 only 27% understood the fire risk despite 26% of households 
having experienced the fire. With a similar reduction in community 
knowledge of bushfire history, this study also hlghlights a clear attrition in 
community perception of risk and knowledge. This appears to be subject to 
individuals changing perceptions over time and possibly a decrease in the 
instances in which people discuss bushfire issues, it may also be due to 
changing community structure and processes typical of growing peri-urban 
areas (i.e., changing community cohesion and social, human and cultural 
capital), all leading to a lack of collective memory. However, Cunningham 
and Kelly (n.d.) did not investigate reasons behind the observed changing 
perceptions of risk of their respondents. 
Regulations and Risk 
A few authors have also considered the influence of building codes and 
regulations on risk perceptions. Institutional arrangements influence how 
people think about and respond to risk (Winter & Fried, 2000). Gilbert 
(2004) found varying effects: those who had built their homes and had to 
adhere to building codes specifically addressing bushfire safety were more 
aware of the risk because their attention was thus drawn to the issue; 
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however there was no such effect in the new housing estates, because people 
moving to these areas were largely urban people with little prior knowledge 
and awareness of bush fire risk, a lack of concern and even interest. However, 
Montz (1993) suggested that such building requirements may provide a false 
sense of security to residents, who may see their home as hazard-proof when 
it is not, thus distorting their perception of risk. Blanchard and Ryan's 
(2004) study indicated that people who are less aware of the bushfire risk are 
particularly susceptible to low levels of risk perception after undertaking 
some degree of fire-proofing. Fire insurance, which is commonly perceived 
as highly effective in protecting investment from bushfire, as suggested by 
Nelson, Monroe, Fingerman Johnson and Bowers' (2004) study, may also 
provide a false sense of security: if it is believed that belongings will be 
replaced if lost or damaged, perception of risk will be lower (Anderson-
Berry, 2003). 
Anderson-Berry (2003) suggested that "an accurate understanding of 
insurance status and extent of coverage is essential for an accurate and 
realistic perception of risk" (p. 226). Although, many people simply consider 
themselves less vulnerable to hazards than others in the same area who are 
exposed to the same level of risk. The literature indicates that people in high 
fire risk areas more accurately perceive the risk of fire in and around the area 
they live than the risk of fire to their own property. For example, Holden, 
Jones and Gabler (2000) found that while 64% of respondents, from a 
number of Gold Coast suburbs at medium to high levels of bushfire risk, 
perceived a medium to high fire risk for their area, ouly 35% perceived a 
medium to high risk of damage to their home from a bushfire. This may be 
driven by an unrealistic perception of preparedness. For example, Holden, 
Jones and Gabler (2000) also identified a large gap between stated 
preparedness and actual preparedness. Such gaps between perceptions and 
actual susceptibility moderates the perceived level of risk, which 
consequently leads a person to be more at risk. 
Many people move to and live in peri-urban areas for non-hazards benefits. 
The literature clearly indicates that people highly value the aesthetic appeal 
of the rural surroundings, and that this is the primary reason for living in the 
area (Gilbert, 2004; Monroe, Bowers & Hermansen, 2003a). Living in the 
area because of the importance of community suclt as to be close to family 
and friends, as proposed by Handmer and Penning-Roswell (1990) (in 
Gilbert, 2004), appeared to be a minor motivation throughout the literature. 
For example, Gilbert (2004) found that just 11% of respondents cited 
community benefits, which was suggested to be the result of a decreasing 
sense of community in his study areas. Nevertheless, such non-hazard 
benefits do distort perceptions of risk, many people are aware of the bushfire 
risk but choose to live with it in order to gain the perceived benefits. Most of 
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Gilbert's respondents agreed that the benefits of living in their peri-urban 
area outweighed the risks. Holden et al. (2000) found that people in their 
focus groups were particularly well aware and knowledgeable about bushfire 
in their area, but were still willing to take that risk. 
Bushfire risk perception has also been related to various demographic and 
socioeconomic factors. For example Beringer (2000) found that the 
perceived fire hazard rating decreased with increasing age, he explained that 
older residents may consider themselves less vulnerable because of increased 
experience and knowledge of the fire hazards. Gilbert (2004) also observed a 
pattern similar to Beringer (2000) in one community, however he found the 
reverse in the other community and suggested that increased experience and 
knowledge may have alternatively lead to increasing risk perceptions with 
increasing age. Gender has also been investigated, for example Beringer 
(2000) and Gilbert (2004) found differences in bushfire knowledge between 
genders. Men tended to have a better understanding of bushfire, and this 
was statistically significant in Beringer's (2000) study, and he suggested that 
a lack of knowledge may lead to females perceiving the bushfire to be a 
greater threat. Anderson-Berry (2003) linked level of education with risk 
perception; people with a higher education are likely to have a more accurate 
perception of risk because they more readily understand the scientific 
complexities of hazards, and they are likely to be better skilled at searching 
for and acquiring information. Fothergill and Peek (2004) reviewed the 
literature concerning the affect of socioeconomic status on risk perceptions; 
it appears that people of lower socioeconomic status may perceive higher 
levels of risk possibly because poorer people have little control over their 
lives and hold little power in the world. However occupation may affect risk 
perception, people of lower socioeconomic status tend to work in more 
hazardous occupations which can moderate risk perceptions (Fothergill & 
Peek, 2004). Fisek, Yeniceri, Muderrisoglu and Ozkarar (2002) alternatively 
suggested that socioeconomic status does not affect risk perception; for 
example income had no effect on overall risk perception. These studies 
strongly suggest that while demographics and socioeconomic factors can 
influence risk perceptions, the resultant effect is largely unpredictable. 
Expectation ofthe impact of a bushfire event 
Most people are well aware of the potential major impacts of bushfire, the 
effects are often experienced through mass media coverage, and many peri-
urban people understand that they live in a fire-prone area. However it 
appears that there is an overwhelming majority of people who do not expect 
a bushfire event to occur where they live, or at least whilst they are living 
there. Considering the high fire risk in most peri-urban areas, most people 
participating in various studies spoke about "if' a fire comes rather than 
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"when" (Monroe & Nelson, 2004; Nelson, Monroe & Fingerman Johnson , 
2004). People tend to consign rare events to the distant future' and do not 
consider that "some time" could be tomorrow (Kerry, Kelk, Etkin, Burton, & 
Kalhok, 1999). If a fire did come however, there were various expectations of 
the event, and expectations were often based on the perception of bush fire as 
an uncontrollable or controllable event. Those people who perceive fire as 
uncontrollable thus expect random and significant destruction where 
snppression efforts are futile. These expectations were voiced during focus 
group discussions in Winter and Fried's (2000) study. Participants 
characterised wildfire as an awesome, uncontrollable force where 
destruction is inevitable. The participants however, had experienced wildfire 
either directly or indirectly, and many saw dramatic examples of fire 
behaviour, examples that contradicted expectations such as houses with a 
300-ft-wide defensible space destroyed and wood sheds left standing despite 
being directly exposed to the flames. It is apparent that these participants 
did not have an understanding of the impact of embers on buildings. 
Participants who had directly experienced the fire held stronger beliefs that 
destruction was inevitable. The authors suggested that such an attitude helps 
them cope with the issue of personal responsibility for their loss. In the 
absence of hazard experience, similar expectations of random or total 
destruction can also be formed by vicarious experiences through the mass 
media, which tends to focus on destruction and loss of life (Paton, 2003). 
There are also many misconceptions about bushfire in circulation, which 
could also lead a person to believe that bushfire is an uncontrollable event. 
For example, there is the expectation that bushfires are so severe that only 
houses built especially to withstand bushfire will survive, or that houses 
explode in bushfires (Ramsay & Rudolph, 2003). 
In contrast, there are people who perceive bushfire as a controllable event 
and thus expect controlled and insignificant damage, and particularly do not 
expect their homes or property to be damaged, wholly or even partially. Such 
expectations may be based on a lack of knowledge, misinformation, or due to 
beliefs or experience based on successful fire suppression and controlled 
damage in the past (Kumagai et al., 2004a), It is also likely that these people 
are most at risk in a bushfire due to a probable lack of preparedness, and late 
evacuation in the instance where bushfire threatens their home. There were 
a number of people in Brennan's (1998) study who did not expect that the 
fire would come near their property, but ifthe fire did happen to approach, 
and they felt threatened, they presumed that they would be able to evacuate 
safely. One respondent said they would "make a spilt-second decision on 
whether to stay or go and consult with my neighbour [when the fire reached 
the house next door]" (Brennan, 1998, p, 16), which would have been a very 
dangerous survival strategy had the fire reached next door. Discussions willi 
respondents indicated that they did not consider what conditions would be 
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like when evacuating as the fire approached. Furthermore, residents were 
more ready to accept that the fire was under control than the fire fighters 
who were concerned about a wind change. Similarly, during the Ash 
Wednesday fires there were many people watching the fire front, not 
expecting to find themselves in the path of the fire and thus not taking any 
precautions, until the wind changed (Lazarus & Elley, 1984; Krusel & Petris, 
1992). A lack of knowledge of fire behaviour and conditions, leading to such 
unfounded expectations, is life threatening. A large proportion of deaths 
during the Ash Wednesday fires were due to late evacuations, and 
deliberately entering the fire area, because people did not recognise the real 
threat to their safety (Krusel & Petris, 1992). The extreme wind change that 
occurred on Ash Wednesday, which was unexpected by the majority of 
people, was associated with most deaths. A respondent in Holden et a!.'s 
(2000) study expressed concern about the general lack of understanding "If 
there is a fire down the bottom, you've only got 3 minutes. They have 
absolutely no idea" (p. 3). Additionally, the loss of electricity and water 
during a bushfire event is in many cases unexpected. Water is obviously a 
crucial element in fighting fires, and there is a heavy reliance on mains water 
supply and electricity for water pumps, however these services do often fail 
because of bushfire. There were a number of examples during the Ash 
Wednesday bushfires where the fire could have been controlled, and houses 
saved, if there was water (Lazarus & Elley, 1984). 
The expectation that fire can be controlled on the other hand, may be based 
on a good understanding of bushfire and mitigative measures. In this 
instance, expectations of the bushfire event and potential impacts are more 
realistic. For example, respondents in Nelson, Monroe, Fingerman Johnson 
and Bowers (2004) and Monroe and Nelson's (2004) studies, who seemed to 
have a good understanding of bushfire, did not believe that bushfire events 
were out of their hands, they "had a healthy respect for the damage that a 
wildfire can do" (Nelson et a!., 2004, p. 423). While there was the general 
expectation that houses prepared for bushfire would withstand the event, 
they understood that houses and property could be lost, including houses 
that were prepared, if certain climatic conditions existed. 
The Colorado Office of Community Services (Burns, Porter-Norton, Mosher 
& Richard, 2003) undertook focus group discussions consisting of 275 
people from 29 Western Colorado communities. While it was noted that the 
participants were not necessarily representative residents of their 
communities, they were chosen for their good understanding of their 
respective communities and because they had some awareness of, and 
interest in bushfire. The participants also had a very good understanding of 
the direct and indirect inlpacts of bushfire. Although discussions centred on 
participants' ideas and concerns about bushfire issues (i.e., did not 
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necessarily reflect what the respondents actually expected would happen to 
themselves or their community), respondents acknowledged that wildfire 
would impact on the cultural, social and economic fabric of a community. 
They mentioned the cumulative effects and the negative consequences for 
the economic health of the region, quality of life and scenic heauty of the 
area, for example, and the social costs such as neighbourhood relations and 
other values that cannot be easily reconstructed. This study indicates that 
there are a considerable number of people who do have realistic 
expectations, or at least ideas, of bushfire and associated potential impacts. 
However, through various accounts given by people after experiencing a 
bushfire, it appears that regardless of a person's understanding, knowledge 
and expectations of a bushfire event, when a bushfire actually occurs, for 
many people, the bushfire was not only unexpected but many events that 
unfolded were unexpected, and pre-conceived expectations were often not 
met. 
Indirect costs, particularly social costs, are difficult to measure, and are often 
omitted in official loss statistics complied in the aftermath of a natural 
disaster, and thus do not reflect the true costs of a disaster (David, Baish & 
Hearn Morrow, 1999). Therefore, unless one has experienced a disaster, it is 
difficult to actually know what to expect, and given that people generally do 
not expect a bushfire to occur, they perceive a low risk of damage to their 
homes (Holden et al. , 2000) and are over-confident in their ability to cope in 
the event of a bushfire (Odgers & Rhodes, 2002), it is not surprising that 
they are shocked when a bushfire does occur. For example, from Halvorson's 
(2002) investigation into the 2000 Bitter Root Valley (Montana) fires, 
people described finding themselves "living in harms way", some 
respondents expressed disbelief or even denial that bushfires were burning 
close enough to threaten communities. Everyone in the area felt affected, and 
many were significantly traumatised by the event and experienced multiple 
anxieties. Various comments from respondents indicate that the magnitude 
of the event was completely unexpected as were the short and long term 
psychological, economic and environmental effects. People often do not 
expect that their basic needs can be compromised (Debelle, 1993), and that it 
takes such a long time to get back to normal. The 2003 fires in Canberra 
particularly highlight the latter point, The Age newspaper (Rising from the 
ashes, 2004) interviewed residents who were affected by bushfire one year 
after the event, and revealed that very few had rebuilt their homes. This was 
partly due to planning delays, under insurance and a shortage of builders, 
but also because of the enormity of the situation, not only rebuilding a home 
but also lives, which has been overwhelming for some people and impossible 
for others. 
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Expectation of themselves 
What people expect of themselves before, during and after a natural bazard, 
such as in preparation, protecting property and recovering from disaster, is 
related to perceptions of who is responsible. Responsibility can be linked 
with property rights to the hazard. For example, if the risk is regarded as 
public (Le., the magnitude of risk an individual faces depends on the actions 
of others), then the individual perceives him or herself as having little 
responsibility in reducing the risk and/or dealing with the consequences, if 
the risk is regarded as private (Le., an individual's own behaviour determines 
the magnitude of risk), then the individual perceives him or herself as having 
primary responsibility. Bushfire risk can be viewed as having both public and 
private components because various people (e.g., residents and public land 
managers) contribute to the risk and share, to varying degrees, in the 
consequences. Perceived responsibility, in particular will play a role in 
determining which risks are ultimately reduced, and by whom (Winter & 
Fried, 2000). 
Preparedness and mitigation 
Recent studies investigating bushfire preparedness and mitigation have 
indeed found that people do perceive some level of personal responsibility. 
For example, Winter and Fried (1997, cited in Winter & Fried, 2000, pp. 36-
37) found that most respondents (80%) in their Michigan study considered 
wildfire protection to be either an equally shared responsibility between 
homeowners and the government (54%) or primarily a responsibility of the 
homeowner (26%). Very few (6%) saw the government as solely responsible 
for protection. Furthermore, in accepting some responsibility, most 
homeowners in Michigan were willing to pay for wildfire protection: willing 
to pay for protection activities undertaken by the state and/or by the 
individual (Fried, Winter & Gilless, 1999); and willing to pay US$57 per year 
for a 50% reduction in risk (Winter & Fried, 2001). Winter and Fried (2000) 
investigated which fire protection activities Michigan homeowners viewed as 
their own responsibility, and found that responsibilities were generally 
limited to being careful with fire and protecting their own property from 
wildfire damage, as well as maintaining insurance coverage on their home 
and personal property. However, because many respondents held the view 
that fire is an uncontrollable force that burns indiscriminately across 
oWnerships, some declared that fire protection is simply everyone's 
responsibility. Common fire protection activities cited throughout the 
literature that people expect themselves to undertake, or are at least aware 
of, include clearing and removing vegetation around the house (e.g., tree 
limbs, understorey, grass, leaves), keeping appropriate equipment on hand 
(e.g., water pumps, hoses, sprinklers), mowing the property, removing 
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flammable rubbish, insuring the house and using fire retardant building 
materials (Monroe, Jacobson & Marynowski, 1999; Holden et al., 2000; 
Odgers & Rhodes, 2002; Nelson et al., 2004). Despite the general perception 
of personal responsibility and the various activities people know and expect 
themselves to undertake to fulfil their responsibilities, many people do not 
actually take action to prepare themselves or their property for bushfire. 
Taking action can be moderated by several factors. In particular, if a person 
does not perceive the bushfire risk it is nnlikely that they will participate in 
fire protection activities. In addition, many people who perceive there is a 
bushfire risk, and even knowing what actions to take to reduce the risk, still 
do not always undertake fire protection activities (McCaffrey, 2004). For 
example, a focus group participant in Holden et al.'s (2000) study 
commented on the distance between awareness and action succinctly; 
"People are aware of quite a lot of things these days, but few things are put 
into action. Like my neighbour who is a fire fighter. His property is full of 
scrub and fallen palm leaves, but he hasn't done anything about it. If anyone 
is aware, he is; but he hasn't done anything about it" (Holden et a!., 2000, 
P·4)· 
According to McCaffrey (2004), in considering mitigation measures, people 
engage in two types of evaluation: cost-benefit and implementation 
feasibility. Cost-benefit analysis involves weighing the financial costs against 
the expected return of the investment over a relevant time frame. Many fire 
protection measures are costly (e.g., building modifications and removal of 
large trees), and there is significant uncertainty in estimating the benefit 
because there is no guarantee of protection from bushfire. "People do not 
exert any effort "for nothing"; they need to feel that their efforts will pay of[' 
(Kumagai et a!., 2004a, p. 30). It is also difficult for people to continually 
exert resources and effort for long periods of time (Kumagai et a!., 2004a). 
This is particularly true for people on low income (or perhaps restrained by 
other socioeconomic factors) where costs are proportionately greater than 
for those on a high income. Turner, Nigg and Paz (1986, cited in Fothergill & 
Peek, 2004, p. 92) found that disaster preparedness increases steadily with 
income levels. Fisek, Yeniceri, Muderrisoglu and Ozkarar (2002) also found 
that income was an important predictor of behavioural as well as 
psychological preparedness. A person who does not own their home is also 
likely to assume higher costs than expected returns because of the shorter 
time frame typical of renters. Making a relatively large investment for a 
probable short period of time, and for someone else's property, can certainly 
be perceived as doing something for nothing. Indeed Beringer (2000) found 
that non-property owners were less likely than property owners to make 
even small investments in fire protection, such as cleaning guttering, reading 
bushfire literature and discussing what their family should do in the event of 
a fire. Furthermore, people who perceive bushfire as an uncontrollable force 
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will be less likely to invest in protection measures because of the expectation 
that their efforts will be futile (Winter & Fried, 2000; Nelson et al., 2004) 
'!be feasibility of implementing an intervention includes consideration of the 
environmental and technical viability of a fire protection activity: how well it 
fits with the area and current land use, and the availability of skills and 
resources. It also includes socio-cultural and personal considerations such as 
whether the activity conforms to personal beliefs, community, mores and 
laws (McCaffrey, 2004). A significant problem in protecting houses against 
bushfire is its perceived incompatibility with values about landscape forms, 
and other beliefs and values about the natural environment. Environmental 
values are fundamental to "our human identity and fulfilment depend(s) to a 
great extent on the satisfactory expression of these values ... reflect(ing) a 
profound human craving for affiliating with nature and wildlife" (Kellert, 
1996, cited in Nelson et al., 2004, p. 414), or as simply stated by a 
respondent in Winter, Vogt and Fried's (2002) study; ''We live in the 
woods ... because we want to live in the woods" (p. 19). Removing or 
modifying vegetation around the house is generally seen as sacrificing the 
closeness to nature, the scenic beauty of the property, privacy, and the 
conservation of energy afforded through shade trees (Monroe, Long & 
Marynowski, 2003b; Nelson et al., 2004; Nelson, Monroe & Fingerman 
Johnson, 2005). A resident said that it would affect her emotionally to cut 
down trees (Nelson et al., 2005), and some felt so strongly about 
maintaining naturalness that they believed that if a fire did come it should 
take their house as well as the trees (Nelson et al., 2004), indicating that 
some people simply value the forest more than their house. On the other 
hand, in line with different people's values (and also the ecosystem in which 
they live), whilst valuing nature, some residents also value a well maintained 
yard with a lawn for example. Therefore in this instance, while not always 
intentional, people are creating a defensible space to match their particular 
landscape values (Nelson et al., 2005); "'!be landscape of any farm is the 
owner's portrait of himself' (Leopold, 1939, cited in Nelson et al., 2005, p. 
323). Although there is evidence that activities and modifications undertaken 
on one's property need to be "within reason", as determined by the social 
norm of the community. Respondents in Monroe and Nelson's (2004) study 
reported social norms about fire preparedness in their communities, 
however the degree varied from certainty that their neighbours would 
disapprove of defensible space to equal certainty that their neighbours would 
not care what they did on their land. '!be Institute of Medicine (2002) 
considers such social norms as one of the significant factors in predicting 
willingness to adopt appropriate safety measures. 
McCaffrey (2004) also explained that the lack of action in undertaking 
bushfire protection activities is additionally due to the fact that people live 
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busy and complicated lives, which often means that natural hazards have low 
salience compared to other concerns. People's judgements about preparation 
include reasoning about their permanence and their ease of adoption, thus 
fire protection measures that require little investment in time and effort both 
initially and over time, are favoured. Through investigating which 
preparation activities people have and have not undertaken, Odgers and 
Rhodes (2002) found that the activities actually undertaken were most likely 
to have been done for reasons other than bushfire, such as cutting back and 
removing vegetation from around the house and mowing the lawn, which 
also fulfils the desire for a tidy yard. Similarly, sprinklers and hoses are also 
installed for the purpose of watering gardens. Odgers and Rhodes (2002) 
also identified that activities least commonly adopted are those that are 
deliberate and specific to bushfire risk such as having a non-electric pump 
and a written plan. This pattern is mirrored throughout the literature and 
indicates that people in fire-prone areas are generally under-prepared. 
Furthermore, people who have experienced fire and even indicate their 
intentions to prepare themselves for a future event do not necessarily take 
action. For example, Hamer (2001) discussed his neighbour's experience 
with bushfire which burned the (unmanaged) forest on his property and 
would have spread to houses along the street if not for a neighbour who 
stayed behind to fight the fire. After the fire the person cleared the grass 
under his trees and trimmed the limbs, however in time, with the fire no 
longer front-page news and new activities and issues needing attention, 
weeds were neglected and the forest was returning to its pre-fire hazardous 
state. Hamer (2001) on the other hand, who actually lost his house in the 
fire, is moving to another peri-urban area, building a fire-proof home, and 
defying community norms by creating defensible space. Although, 
experience with bushfire inconsistently influences individual preparedness 
in the same manner that it influences risk perception, there are a number of 
examples where people who have lost their homes to bushfire, rebuild fire-
proof homes (Gilbert, 2004; Thistleton, 2004). 
Response and recovery 
The literature clearly indicates that in the event of a fire, a person's first 
priority is to protect themselves and their family, and, where possible, to 
protect their property. Families with young children and other dependent 
persons tend to evacuate, younger people «40 years) are also more likely to 
evacuate because of young children and little bushfire experience (Beringer, 
2000). However there is a large proportion of people who intend to stay with 
their house, most of whom are male [67% in Beringer's (2000) study and 
62% in Odgers and Rhodes' (2002) study J because women tend to evacuate 
with dependents, and because women may perceive a higher risk due to a 
lack of knowledge (Beringer, 2000). Those people who intend to stay with 
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their homes, expect that they will be able to do so and thus not be forced to 
evacuate or be stopped by roadblocks on their way home. There are a 
number of accounts where people have defied the authorities, risking arrest, 
to get to their homes (Lazarus & Elley, 1984). People who were prevented 
from staying with their homes later expressed much anger from the distress 
that it caused (Beringer, 2000; Odgers & Rhodes, 2002). Although 
remaining with the house in a bushfire event sigrrificantly increases house 
survival, and thus will protect people providing they remain inside the house 
as the fire front passes (Krusel & Petris, 1992), people with unrealistic 
expectations of the event and themselves, will be at risk. 
Thus, there are many people living in high fire risk areas wbo do not perceive 
the risk, do not adequately understand bushfire and the inlpacts and under-
invest in fire protection measures. Despite this, there is a general expectation 
that they will be able to cope when faced with the danger of bush fire (Odgers, 
2002). However when a bushfire event actually occurs many of these people 
come to realise that they expected too much of themselves. In Brennan's 
(1998) study, of 43 people or households who had planned to stay with their 
house during a fire event, only 15 were fully committed (being prepared and 
confident). The uncommitted households were those who were likely to leave 
the house at some stage during the fire, despite the intention of staying, 
which is a dangerous survival strategy. It seems that "those who were 
uncommitted suffered stress from the experience of being alone waiting for 
the fire, were not confident even when fairly well prepared, or understood 
that they were not prepared and relied heavily on the fire fighting services. 
One person's experience during the Ash Wednesday fires describes the 
physical and psychological stress a bushfire can have on a person; "[we] 
worked like mad for a couple of hours [preparing the house]. .. spent half an 
hour in the pool setting up the reserve pipe to the filter, but I forgot that the 
electricity was off. I wasn't thinking clearly" (Lazarus & Elley, 1984, p. 12). To 
the inexperienced person, it is not always obvious that being prepared for a 
bushfire involves much more than physical preparations: a person must be 
fully aware of and perceive the risk of bushfire; understand how bushfires 
behave; how people and houses survive in bushfires and what to expect 
during a bushfire; they need to have a comprehensive household plan 
consisting of what each household member's role will be; and be 
psychologically ready (Odgers & Rhodes, 2002). The latter points it seems 
are most commonly neglected, which leads people to evacuate at the last 
minute and risk their lives. 
People also tend to be overconfident in their ability to recover from bushfire 
(Odgers, 2002), but various reports investigating people after they have been 
affected by fire indicate that recovery for many people is not an easy process; 
it is a stressful and long process. The Sydney Morning Herald (Marriner & 
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Holder, 2004) reported that it took six months for a woman to face returning 
to the site of her old home and one year after the Canberra fires, which had 
burnt her home, she finally felt that she was ready to move on. Similarly, a 
man spoke to Peter Harris (2004) about the year in limbo after the Canberra 
fires burnt his home, and his struggle to move away from the "bushfire 
victim" mentality. He wanted everything to return to normal, and in the 
beginning he thought that it would be possible; they were insured, and 
possessions could be replaced, and he had his family. However, he and his 
wife came to realise that they could not return to their prior life, they had lost 
more than a home, they had lost part of themselves. Furthermore, another 
couple who also lost their home to the Canberra fires described the struggle 
with an avalanche of unexpected and unwanted decisions concerning their 
house and their lives (Campbell, 2003). Even those people who had not lost 
their homes experienced a traumatic year after the Canberra fires: "The fires 
have had a big impact on the people who stayed behind ... We're living in a 
very desolate environment, the ambience of the area has gone" (Rising from 
the ashes, 2004, p. 1). and "The wind blows and it's louder than it ever was 
before ... You don't hear the kids anymore" (Rising from the ashes, 2004, p. 
1). There are some instances, however seemingly very few, where the 
situation has not been so dire. For example, a couple who moved into 
temporary acco=odation (a townhouse) after losing their home to the 
Canberra fires found that they loved the new lifestyle and living with less, 
and being free from clutter (Rising from the ashes, 2004). 
People who have a strong sense of co=unity or societal co=itment, and 
are generally well prepared and/or in a better position than others for 
example, feel compelled and that it is their responsibility to lend their 
support to others during and after a bushfire event. For example, Lazarus 
and Elley (1984) identified people who, after preparing their own house, 
helped others to prepare, and people who had equipment to figilt the fires 
protecting their own house as well as neighbours'. One respondent explained 
that she would not have known what to do if her neigilbour had not come 
and helped her. People in the Bitter Root Valley fires used existing formal 
and informal social networks and organisations to rally together to help 
others prepare their houses, and after the fires, to help people affected by the 
fire to recover; and to "do the rigilt thing". Some people were frustrated 
when they were not able to do anything to help (Halvorson, 2002). 
Furthermore, many people, particularly young people, want to be directly 
involved in fighting fires with the fire brigade; 66% of the 18 to 25 year old 
respondents were involved in fire figilting in Beringer's (2000) study, and 
according to Beringer this perhaps reflects the number of young people who 
are involved in the local fire brigades. 
Expectation of neigh hours and community 
There are some important community characteristics that can determine the 
resilience of a community, and the individuals living within it, to natural 
disasters. Buckle, Marsh and Smale (2000) listed a number of factors that 
support individuals, families and communities to minimise the consequences 
of disasters including: shared community values; aspirations and goals; 
established social infrastructure; positive social and economic trends; 
sustainability of social and economic life; partnerships (between agencies, 
between community groups and between commercial enterprises); 
communities of interest (where a geographically diverse group shares a 
common interest, skill or expertise); established networks; and resources 
and skills. Similarly, Jakes et al. (2002) highlighted the importance of social 
capital, human capital and cultural capital in community preparedness for 
bushfire, and Anderson-Berry (2003) simply stated that "closer-knit 
communities tend to be more resilient" (p. 226). 
Figure 11.1 Rural Fire Brigade member and cohesiveness 
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Being part of a community that is cohesive and rich with the above social 
characteristics will compel individuals and groups to assist fellow 
community members in need, as was described in the previous section. It 
will also mean that community members in need of assistance will look for 
support from their community. Furthermore, the community will be more 
likely to act as an organised collective group in preparing for, responding to 
and recovering from natural disasters. The importance of social responses 
(e.g., decision making, management and support), together with structural 
responses (e.g., building materials, defensible space and insurance), to 
bushfire threats was recently highlighted by Steelman and Kunkel (2004). 
They noted that social responses will be unique to individual communities: 
social responses operate at the local community level and consequently take 
diverse forms in different communities; and the social capacity of a 
community to respond is strongly dependant on its characteristics leading to 
vast differences across communities. 
Preparedness and mitigation 
A community with the social capacity to respond to a bushfire threat can 
encourage its individuals and equip them with the necessary skills and 
resources to undertake measures to protect their home. McGee and Russell 
(2003) investigated the link between social cohesion and bushfire 
preparedness and found a positive relationship; there were extensive social 
networks within the long-term resident community that addressed bushfire 
preparedness, newcomers however were generally not part of this network 
and were found to be less prepared for the event of a fire. There is also 
evidence that individuals in this community are self-sufficient and confident 
in the face of the bushfire threat because of the strong social network of 
support. Larsson and Enander (1997) have also suggested that how a person 
perceives the views of other members of their community to disaster 
preparations may influence an individual's actions. Although this is an area 
that needs to be developed more, it is likely that people within a cohesive 
community that has a positive attitude toward bushfire preparedness, such 
as in McGee and Russell's (2003) study, will be motivated to undertake fire 
protection measures because of an expectation of a positive reaction from 
others. On the other hand, if undertaking fire protection measures is 
expected to create negative reactions, such as defensible space in a 
community that values naturalness, it is unlikely that the measures will be 
undertaken. Hamer (2001) for example, was concerned about the bushfire 
threat in his neighbourhood and considered creating defensible space 
around his home, however in a discussion with a neighbour he realised that 
the action could create considerable negative reaction. He therefore did not 
create defensible space (perhaps consequently, Hamer's house was later 
destroyed by bushfire). Flint and Luloff (2005) have explained that a 
community will not take action and mobilise resources, and thus support 
individual fire protection measures, unless there is a shared community 
perception of risk. Furthermore, a fire protection measure that requires 
collective action is also unlikely to be undertaken by an individual unless 
others in the neighbourhood take action (Paton, 2003). However, in the 
instance where a community has collectively taken action to reduce the risk 
of bushfire, there are high expectations that all others in the community will 
do the same. For example, when "appropriate defensible actions" are not 
undertaken by residents, this inaction is viewed as personal apathy or 
irresponsibility (Burns, Porter-Norton, Mosher & Richard, 2003). In many 
cases, those who do not join in fire protection activities are newcomers 
and/ or people without a strong connection the community in question, 
respondents in a number of studies have voiced their concern or frustration 
with the lack of participation of newcomers in particnlar (Halvorson, 2002; 
Gilbert, 2004). 
Response and recovery 
Family and community cohesion is an important predictor of an individual's 
response to a natural hazard; social ties tend to increase the probability of an 
effective response (Krusel & Petris, 1992; Anderson-Berry, 2003). Social ties 
are an inlportant informal communication network. The reception of 
information during a bushfire is particularly important to enable people to 
make informed decisions about what actions should be undertaken and 
when. During the Bitter Root Valley fires, residents responded to the general 
confusion of whether to evacuate or not by monitoring various conditions to 
judge the level of risk and then disseminating this information, which was 
tailored to the needs of others in the community, through various 
information networks (Halvorson, 2002). Bitter Root Valley is a good 
example of a community with the social capacity to respond effectively to 
bushfires, and community members, particularly those born and raised there 
and thus closely affiliated with the community, rely on this social capacity for 
support and, as a community, to be independent from outside groups. For 
example, many evacuated residents did not utilise the Red Cross shelter 
because they sought accommodation with friends and family, or camped 
with other families by the river (Halvorson, 2002). 
In the bushfire aftermath there was a similar "pulling together" within the 
Bitter Root Valley community. Ai; discussed previously, community members 
established formal and informal support networks to help bushfire victims. A 
strong sense of community emerged both during the bushfire and after, and 
the experience of dealing with the fire hazard seemed to give an additional 
sense of identity to the communities (Halvorson, 2002). Kumagai et al. 
(2004a) explained that "a community's disaster recovery processes reflect 
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the community's pre-disaster social and physical conditions" (p. 31). Indeed 
the Bitter Root Valley communities were well prepared for disaster and were 
thus able to deal effectively with the aftermath; it appeared that the majority 
of people in need of assistance and support received assistance and support 
from fellow community members. Halvorson (2002) did identify victims 
who were not well established or connected to the local community, and 
these people fell outside of the community networks, however, critical 
financial and moral support was provided by external aid, the efforts of 
which were enhanced by the community support networks. Without such a 
strong sense of community and informal and formal community support 
networks, preparedness, response and recovery efforts would have 
proceeded incrementally and haphazardly (Halvorson, 2002). The existence 
of active community leadership has also been identified as an important 
component of hazard mitigation, response and recovery (Petterson, 1999; 
Reddy, 2000). There is a need, if not an expectation, for somebody, 
particularly existing community leaders, to activate and organise the 
community and its resources to respond to hazards effectively. Most research 
shows that such leadership does indeed emerge in the situation of a hazard 
(Petterson, 1999; Reddy, 2000). Despite the expectations of fellow 
community members that a person may have in times of crises, it appears 
that people are nevertheless amazed and heartened by the level of support 
that was actually received. Even people from the Bitter Root Valley 
communities expressed amazement: "The community pulling together was 
amazing for me" (Halvorson, 2002, p. 7) . 
Many studies investigating the weeks or months after a disaster have 
reported the pulling-together of communities, even communities that were 
not cohesive pre-disaster (Moore, Daniel, Linnan, Campbell, Benedict & 
Meier, 2004). Such collective moments are termed "altruistic or therapeutic 
communities", however this is not a long-term effect. Participants in Moore 
et al.'s (2004) study described the later phases (after experiencing the 
therapeutic community) of the Hurricane Floyd flood disaster in North 
Carolina as being characterised by a general lack of concern on the part of 
fellow residents (and governmental authorities) . As a community begins to 
recover and the effects of the disaster become less apparent, memories fade, 
people are less willing to help and other issues and problems begin to take 
priority. For many, a period of disillusionment and anger entails the 
experiences and perceptions of high levels of trust, social cohesion, or 
collective efficacy, possibly leading to changes in the way these people view 
their community and their place in it (Moore et ai. , 2004). Hoffman (2000) 
also described the dichotomy of a community following the Oakland 
Berkeley Firestorm in 1991. "At first the outside community saw us with 
sympathy. Eventually, when recovery took longer than the day, week or 
month they envisioned, they came to view us as greedy whiners and 
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undeserving receivers of pots of gold" (p. 60). Driven by jealousy, the 
disaster victims thus became targets of wanton envy, they were viewed as 
"lucky" because they had all new things and would eventually have new 
houses. In response, disaster victims withdrew from the outside community 
and adopted equally separating, and in due course dehumanising, 
conceptualisations to mark them. 
A human-caused or "technological" disaster can also set the stage for anger 
and conflict as victims blame what they perceive to be the responsible party 
and disagree over remediation measures (Carroll, Cohn, Seesholtz & Higgins, 
2005). Bushfires have elements of both technological and natural disasters. 
Bushfires are a natural occurrence in many parts of the world, however, they 
can also be started by a deliberate or accidental human act. Technology also 
plays a role in suppression and management of bushfire. Carroll, Cohn, 
Seesholtz and Higgins (2005) investigated bushfire as a galvanising and 
fragmenting influence in three Arizona communities and found that 
although the disaster literature is replete with examples of communities 
suffering internal conflict in the aftermath of disaster events, there was little 
within-community tension and conflict in the communities studied. Rather, 
the communities pulled together. However, much of the disaster literature in 
this area does not address bushfire, therefore further investigation is 
warranted. Tension and conflict were apparent, but most-of the blaming 
behaviour in these communities was directed at outside agencies, which will 
he discussed in later sections. Kumagai, Bliss, Daniels and Carroll (2004b) 
suggested that it should not be assumed that community responses to 
bushfire events are simple or predictable. 
Expectations of Organisations 
The public perceive the primary responsibility of fire and emergency services 
to be fire suppression and protecting people and property, and, in most 
cases, the fire services in particular are perceived to fulfil their roles 
effectively. Holden et al.'s (2000) study suggested that regardless of a 
person's awareness or knowledge of fire brigades, most people highly value 
the fire brigade that services their area, even people who are not sure abont 
which type of brigade actually services their area. Furthermore, Gilbert 
(2004) revealed that there is a general high level of confidence in local 
brigades. Such positive views may be attributed to a number of factors: fire 
fighters are often depicted at the front line of a bushfire, risking their lives to 
save others and are thus often viewed as heroes; and local brigades in 
particular are usually part of the community with family and friends 
volunteering and working for the community. As a result local fire brigades 
are viewed as distinct from government agencies. 
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Preparedness and mitigation 
Efforts made by fire brigades and their community schemes such as 
Community Fireguard (CFA, Victoria), to communicate with the local 
community appear to be well appreciated. There is an expectation that the 
information received by the local brigades is accurate and tailored to local 
conditions, and is thus perceived as credible. Participants in McGee and 
Russell's (2003) study indicated their preference for information from the 
local fire brigade, above other information sources. It was also suggested that 
most people in this community prefer to actively seek such information 
themselves, however, these people also tended to accept much of the 
responsibility to respond to the bushfire threat. People in other communities 
generally do not perceive themselves as having such a high level of 
responsibility, and are less resourceful, and consequently rely on others to 
provide information. The opinion that fire brigades adequately liaise with the 
general public appears closely related to whether residents have had contact 
with the local fire brigade since living in the area. For example 67% of 
residents in Beringer's (2000) study had had contact with the local fire 
brigade and 67% felt there was sufficient liaison between the CFA and the 
general public. Therefore, although people highly regard and prefer 
information received from their fire brigade, there does not appear to be an 
expectation that fire brigades will be visibly active and have regular contact 
with residents to provide information. Holden et a\. 's (2000) study revealed 
that only 5% of respondents thought that information delivered through door 
knocks and one-on-one meetings would be effective, the majority indicated 
that literature in the form of a pamphlet, booklet or leaflet (65%) and 
television (15%) would be the best delivery mode. Furthermore, in Odgers 
and Rhodes' (2002) study, respondents believed that fire brigades should 
assign a higher priority to bushfire hazard reduction than educating the 
public. Similarly, Holden et a\.'s (2000) respondents thought that fire 
brigades should take a more active role in prevention, however; it was 
perceived that brigades are constrained by a lack of resources and sometimes 
authority. 
Response and recovery 
During a bushfire event there is a huge reliance on fire brigades and 
emergency services, as would be expected. However, it is clear throughout 
the literature that a majority of people expect too much of these services, in 
particular many people expect that fire fighters will be available to protect 
their homes and that they will be specifically warned and told when to 
evacuate (Beringer, 2000; Gilbert, 2004). These expectations are based on a 
lack of awareness; indeed emergency service priorities are to protect people 
and property, but in a major fire event these services are often overwhelmed 
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and not able to meet sucb expectations. Furtbermore, front line fire fighters 
do not always have tbe most accurate and up-to-date information (Brennan, 
1998), and, possibly as a result, actions taken by fire and emergency 
personnel are not always tbe most appropriate. For example, there are a 
number of instances where people have been evacuated, from tbeir otherwise 
safe homes, during tbe height of tbe fire (Braun, 2002). 
Newcomers and tbose who have not experienced a bushfire, who are more 
likely to rely heavily on emergency services, are most often astonished by tbe 
fires and the alleged lack of emergency services (Halvorson, 2002). Carroll, 
Findley, Blatuer, Mendez, Daniels and Walter (2000) also mentioned that 
people's emotional reactions tend to be equal to tbe fire's magnitude and 
intensity. One community in tbeir Washington study appeared to be more 
emotionally charged and more likely to give rise to conflict than tbe other 
two communities because a section of tbis community experienced some 
serious direct impacts tbat tbe other communities did not. Although such 
astonishment and conflict may lead to blaming behaviour, it is more likely 
tbat the government and its agencies, including federal fire services, will be 
blamed ratber tban local fire brigades (see next section). After experiencing a 
bushfire, the community in Odgers and Rhodes' (2002) study praised tbe fire 
services despite an overall opinion tbat tbey could have been better 
prepared, tbe local government was generally viewed as ineffective and 
criticised for its lack of action. 
There is obviously a great reliance on emergency aid organisations after a 
major bushfire, particularly for those people who do not have strong social 
connections to tbe community. However, it would appear that tbere is also a 
large perception gap between what fire victinls expected and what occurred. 
Two major tbemes surfaced from Carroll et al.'s (2005) study: individuals 
expected botb a better organised and more effective distribution of financial 
resources and a more sympatbetic and caring response; and a more 
equalised distribution of resources between tbe tbree communities affected 
by tbe bushfires. This resulted in considerable tension between tbe 
communities and tbe American Red Cross to tbe point tbat tbe organisation 
was picketed by locals. Furthermore, tbe unequal distribution of resources 
created considerable conflict between the three communities. Unequal 
distribution of aid appears to be a common occurrence post-disaster, but is 
nevertbeless unexpected (David et al., 1999; Moore et al., 2004), and people 
of lower socioeconomic status are often furtber marginalised (Fotbergill & 
Peek, 2004). 
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Expectation of government 
Because bushfire risk has a considerable public component, and bushfires 
are commonly perceived as a technological hazard, all levels of government 
are perceived to be responsible to some extent to mitigate bushfire and its 
impacts. However, although there is the general expectation that 
governments need to take action, which actions and to what extent can vary 
considerably from person to person and area to area. Much of the literature 
investigating people's reactions to or acceptability of mitigative measures has 
been based on the Theory of Reasoned Action, which suggests that beliefs are 
a strong predictor of attitudes and attitudes are a strong predictor of 
behaviour (Bright, Vaske, Kneeshaw & Absher, 2002; Vogt, Winter & Fried, 
2002; Vogt, Winter & Fried, 2005). 
Preparedness and mitigation 
People's knowledge and perceptions of fire and fire policies are becoming 
more sophisticated. Thirty to 40 years ago people generally believed that fire 
was bad and thus supported aggressive suppression. As people became more 
knowledgeable about the beneficial effects of fire, attitudes changed and 
support for suppression-only policies gave way to fire management (Cortner, 
Gardner & Taylor, 1990). In most instances, fire management on public land 
is expected, but opinion on how this should be done varies. Prescribed 
burning and mechanical fuel reduction, the major fuel rednction techniques, 
have both been the subject of controversy. For example, in the USA 
mechanical fuel reduction has been broadly supported but environmentalists 
are suspicious because fire more closely mimics natural disturbance 
patterns, and they have accused the federal forest agencies of using fuel 
reduction as an excuse for logging. The tinlber industry and many foresters 
are equally suspicious of prescribed burning, which they consider as 
wasteful, and dangerous because of the risk of the fire getting out of control. 
Similarly, grazing as a fuel management technique has attracted debate 
(Brunson & Shindler, 2004). Peri-urban resident opinion has also led to 
controversy over fire management techniques, however, judgements of 
acceptability can be based on a variety of factors. For example, using a 
Theory of Reasoned Action approach, Bright, Vaske, Kneeshaw and Absher 
(2002) identified six basic belief dimensions that may influence a person's 
perception of bushfire management: anthropocentric; biocentric; 
responsibility; capable/ trust; freedom; and benefit/harm. Knowledge, 
experience and personal importance are also entwined with acceptability 
judgements. 
A study undertaken by Daniel, Weidemann and Hines (2002) in nortbern 
Arizona bas suggested tbat people who value the beauty of forested areas, or 
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value nature for what it provides humans (i.e., the anthropocentric belief 
dimension), are less supportive of fuel management strategies that 
compromise aesthetic values. Prescribed burning and bare fuel breaks in 
particular do not protect aesthetic values. However, there was evidence that 
people in the above study would support other fire management strategies 
that address the safety-aesthetic value trade-off. Newcomers to peri-urban 
areas are perceived to be more anthropocentric. Participants in Monroe et 
al.'s (2003a) study, including various government, non-government and 
industry representatives as well as homeowners representing 13 southern US 
states, indicated that newcomers were viewed as not connected to the land 
and environmentally irresponsible because they planted exotic species and 
complained about bushfire smoke. On the other hand, people who valued 
'naturalness', leaving forested areas as natural as possible (i.e., the biocentric 
belief dimension), were more supportive of prescribed burning because it 
reflects a natural ecosystem process (Nelson et al., 2004; Nelson et al., 
2005)· 
The perception of who is responsible for reducing the bushfire risk can 
influence the acceptability of fire management strategies. As previously 
discussed, a person who regards the bushfire risk as public will perceive the 
government as primarily responsible for reducing the risk and will thus 
expect institutional intervention, consequently leading to institutional 
legitimacy (Winter & Fried, 2000) . Much of the literature suggests that 
people are more in favour of fire management policies that require the 
government to take action rather than themselves (Gardner et al., 1987; 
Blanchard & Ryan, 2004). However, with regard to private property, many 
people do perceive themselves as responsible for protecting their own house. 
They are not supportive of any policies that require homeowners to take 
steps to reduce the risk themselves, because such policies would also 
impinge on perceived rights to freedom. Therefore reducing the fire risk on 
public land is perceived as government responsibility primarily, and fire 
management policies that address the risk on public land are supported, if 
not expected, particularly when homeowners are implementing fire 
protection measures on their own property. A lack of action on public land 
nearby can also moderate private landholder mitigation measures (Kent et 
al., 2003; Anonymous, 2004). However, once again, which specific policies 
will be supported and by whom, will vary. 
Trust has emerged as an important factor influencing public opinion of fire 
management strategies (Vogt, Winter & Fried, 2002; Winter, 2002; Vogt, 
Winter & Fried, 2005). Trust in the government to implement a fire 
management strategy is closely related to the perceived competence of the 
government to implement the strategy successfully. For example, there are a 
number of instances where prescribed burning became out of control and 
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threatened people and properties, therefore the government agency is viewed 
as incompetent and consequently is not trusted to undertake prescribed 
burning safely. As a result people have intensely rejected prescribed burning 
as a fire management strategy (Winter & Fried, 2000; VOgt et al., 2005). 
There is an emphasis on individuality and self-reliance in the western world, 
and the right to free choice is an important concept (McCaffrey, 2004; Bright 
et al., 2002). Therefore government actions that restrict or dictate what is 
done on private property or affect private property values may be resisted. 
Indeed, homeowners are not supportive of policies that affect the way they 
manage their property. Participants in Winter and Fried's (2000) study were 
not supportive of building codes, safety ordinances, zoning and regulations 
to modify vegetation on their own property. They wanted the opportunity for 
voluntary compliance and thought that such policies would be unnecessary 
because of existing and potential insurance markets, and that it would 
detract from aesthetic and convenience aspects of their homes. Blanchard 
and Ryan (2004) suggested that local residents may support land-use 
regulations, including building codes, for new developments because it 
would not impinge their own property rights. Residents in the Burns et al. 
(2003) study, who appeared to have a good understanding of the fire risk 
and the importance of mitigation, were in full support of land-use planning 
and building codes. New residents may also be supportive because there is 
still an element of free choice: they can choose to live in a lower fire risk area 
ifthey do not agree with such regulations. 
A belief that bushfire is harmful to nature may lead a person to not support 
management strategies such as prescribed burning. However, an increase in 
knowledge of bush fire and its effects can influence such beliefs. Cortner et al. 
(1990) discussed the general increase in people's knowledge of the effects of 
fire over the last four decades and an increasing positive attitude toward fire 
(e.g., bushfire is beneficial to nature). Loomis, Blair and Gonzalez-Caban 
(2001) investigated the effect of knowledge on attitudes toward prescribed 
burning and found that Florida residents' attitudes were more supportive of 
prescribed burning as knowledge increased. Therefore an increase in 
knowledge may change a person's perception of bushfire, which may then 
lead to the acceptance of prescribed burning. Indeed, knowledge has been 
found to be an important consideration in reactions to fire management 
issues (Winter, 2002). Blanchard and Ryan (2004) revealed that 
respondents in their south-eastern Massachusetts study who have a high 
level of knowledge about a specific fire hazard reduction strategy were more 
likely to support the use of that strategy. It has therefore been suggested that 
the public be educated about fire management issues (Winter, 2002; 
Blanchard & Ryan, 2004). Loomis, Blair and Gonzalez-Caban's (2001) study 
suggested that educational information can increase knowledge leading to 
attitudes that support prescribed burning. However, once again, the 
effectiveness of public education programs in influencing attitudes or 
knowledge, and behaviour, has been questioned (Cortner et al., 1990). 
Although, it seems that the public expects to receive educational material, 
participants in Winter and Fried's (2000) study were overwhelmingly 
favourable toward educational programs designed to reduce fire ignitions. 
However this was because of a belief that human action, mainly that of 
newcomers and visitors who are viewed as ignorant of the fire danger, is the 
cause of most forest fires. Participants in other studies have indicated their 
desire for information on other bushfire issues such as bushfire awareness 
and preparing homes (Gilbert, 2004). Furthermore, there is particular 
demand for more innovative and community-based information, for example 
information that details how to protect homes from bushfire whilst 
maintaining aesthetic values (Creighton, Baumgartner & Gibbs, 2002), and 
more specific information that assists people to purchase fire protection 
products that are appropriate to their needs and budget (Odgers, 2002). 
The effect of personal experience with bushfire on· attitudes toward fire 
management strategies is also questionable. Vogt (2002) investigated 
seasonal and permanent homeowners' past experiences and approval of fuel 
reduction and found that seasonal homeowners had less experience with 
bushfire and fuel reduction techniques, however, there was general support 
from both seasonal and permanent homeowners for prescribed burning and 
mechanical fuel reduction. Jabobsou, Monroe and Marynowski (2001) and 
Vogt et al. (2005) similarly found no significant effect of past experience with 
busbfire on attitudes toward fire management. On the other hand Blanchard 
and Ryan (2004) suggested that past experience with bushfire can increase 
the level of support for prescribed burning because people who have 
witnessed fires in the past may have become more comfortable with them. 
Although it may depend on the type of experience; participants in Winter 
and Fried's (2000) study who witnessed significant destruction due to an 
escaped prescribed burn were suspicious of prescribed burning and generally 
not supportive of it as a fuel reduction strategy. Additionally, because the 
past experience with busbfire led many to believe that it was an 
uncontrollable force, investroent in suppression infrastructure was 
considered pointless, although it was acknowledged that the government 
needs to respond to bushfires that do occur and ensure that fire fighters are 
well equipped for their own safety. 
Vogt et al. (2005) investigated the effect of personal importance (or personal 
relevance to fuel management techniques) on homeowner's approval of fuel 
management techniques. They found that personal importance was a good 
predictor of approval. For example, from the same study, Winter, Vogt and 
Fried (2002) indicated that if vegetation amenity is important to a person, 
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defensible space compliance will likely be disapproved, if property rights are 
important, any ordinances impinging on such rights will likely be 
disapproved, and if smoke sensitivity is an issue, prescribed burning will also 
likely be disapproved. However, Vogt et al. (2005) also highlighted the wide 
range of factors in addition to personal importance, including belief 
dimension(s), knowledge and experience discussed above, and also social 
and environmental factors associated with where a person lives (e.g., 
demographics, political traditions and ecosystem type), that are intricately 
linked leading to great variations in opinions and acceptability of fire 
management practices between and within locations. Brunson and Shindler 
(2004) found such differences in their western USA study suggesting that 
government policies addressing bushfire management need to be adaptive to 
the local situation at hand. 
Response and recovery 
With increasing knowledge, people's expectations of how the government 
should respond to a bushfire are changing (Cortner et al., 1990). For 
example, people do not necessarily expect a fire to be immediately 
suppressed, however, this depends on a number of factors. For example, 
Kneeshaw, Vaske, Bright & Absher (2004) investigated situational influences 
of acceptable wildland fire management actions, they found that fire origin 
was one of the most important factors for "put the fire out" and one of the 
least important factors for "let the fire burn"; if the fire was ignited through 
lightning there was support for letting the fire burn, and conversely if the fire 
was ignited through human carelessness there was support for putting the 
fire out. Furthermore the relative importance of risk of private property 
damage and forest recovery was consistently high in influencing acceptability 
of management actions; if the fire posed a risk to private property and if 
forest recovery were to take many years there was support for putting the fire 
out. The relative importance of air quality was minor but there was general 
support for putting the fire out if air quality became poor. The relative 
importance of outdoor recreation was lowest, if a recreational area was 
closed due to the fire, recreating in another area nearby may be an 
acceptable substitute. Past experience with bushfire is also an important 
factor, however once again the effect will vary depending on the type of 
expenence. 
In the USA, federal fire services have been criticised in their efforts to 
collaboratively fight fires with local services. Federal fire services focus on 
the big picture of the fire as a generalised event whereas local services have a 
more place-specific view. Some people view this as depersonalisation, which 
grates on local residents and fire fighters whose particular homes and special 
places are at risk (Carroll et aI., 2005). This was the underlying cause of 
much of the post-fire conflict in the communities of Carroll et al.'s (2005) 
study. It appears that local fire fighters expected that their knowledge, skills 
and commitment would have been better valued, and utilised. They also felt 
too constrained by the rules and decisions made at higher levels, and this led 
to local fire fighters and homeowners defying the instructions of the Incident 
Command System. Federal services were also accused of putting the majority 
of their resources into fighting fires in one community, leading to 
intercommunity conflict. Carroll et al. (2005) explained that "the relative 
inflexibility of rational, bureaucratic systems was seen as unable to adapt to 
quickly-changing conditions, something at which the spontaneous creation 
of local helping systems seemed more adept" (p. 316). This highlights the 
importance of the government and its policies to become more attuned to 
local situations, and the importance of communities to become more 
organised and better prepared to be able to respond to bushfire. This would 
lead to effective collaborative efforts that significantly increase the resilience 
of the community. 
The government however, is often blamed in the event of a bushfire. Blaming 
behaviour has been well documented among people affected by msaster, and 
this phenomenon can create much hostility toward the organisation or 
institution that was supposed to protect people from msaster (Kumagai et al., 
2004a), namely the government and its agencies responsible for some aspect 
of fire protection. Just 33.8% of respondents in Odgers and Rhodes' (2002) 
study felt that the local government was effective in responding to bushfires, 
compared with 92% of respondents inmcating that the fire service was 
effective, and although reasons were not given, there appears to be a general 
public opinion that governments are ineffective in their efforts to mitigate 
bushfire. Blaming behaviour can be the result of whether property damage 
was incurred, whether or not a person maintained a sense of control, and/or 
whether the bushfire was perceived as primarily natural or technological 
(Kumagai, Bliss, Daniels & Carroll, 2004b). Participants in Kumagai et al.'s 
(2004b) study who incurred property damage from the Butte Complex Fires 
in Nevada in 1999 attributed the damage to "others actions", specifically 
backfires started by the California Department of Forestry and Fire 
Protection (CDF) in spite of the fact that there was no public evidence of 
such backfires. The study also inmcated that people who had lost their sense 
of control tended to attribute damage to factors associated with fire fighters 
and the CDF. Losing one's sense of control was associated with a belief that 
their property did not receive adequate attention from fire fighters, and not 
being able to obtain up-to-date information during the bushfire. Participants 
who viewed the fires as the result of nature (rather than technology) were 
less likely to blame others, one respondent acknowledged the build up of fuel 
as a contributing factor to fire magnitude but said that humans can not do 
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anything about events that "are totally the act of God" (Kumagai et al., 
2004b, p. 120). 
The primary expectation of all levels of governments post-disaster is the 
provision of assistance, and in many cases actual assistance received falls 
short of what was expected. Controversy about government assistance after 
the Canberra bushfires was well documented throughout the media 
(Government must do more, 2003); $5000 per rebuilding household was 
considered miserly and not enough to rebuild social capital and address the 
social issues following a disaster. Years after Hurricane Floyd in North 
Carolina, families were still waiting for promised assistance, and for 
authorised repair and replacement units, which affects the trust that 
residents have in their local government (Moore et al., 2004). Communities 
rely on external assistance to mitigate the econonric impact associated with 
natural disaster, and indeed, with such assistance, disaster can result in 
economically positive impacts on a stricken community (Kumagai et aI, 
2004a). However, there are a number of issues concerning disaster 
assistance, primarily the issue of equity. As previously discussed it is not 
uncommon that assistance, from both government and non-government 
organisations, does not adequately address those most in need (David et al., 
1999; Fothergill & Peek, 2004). Secondly, because of disaster assistance, the 
costs of disaster are borne not only by those affected, but also by the 
community, all levels of government and the general population (Cortner et 
aI., 1990). Thirdly, there is evidence that people may not undertake 
preventative measures, such as home insurance, in view of the existence of 
disaster recovery programs (Cortner et al., 1990; McKee et al., 2004). 
Because people expect that they can live where they wish, continually putting 
themselves in dangerous situations and thus creating such economic 
problems, Sowell (2004) has suggested phasing out state and federal disaster 
relief and relying more heavily on prevention and mitigation activities, 
particularly insurance. After a disaster there is an expectation of government 
that actions will be taken to prevent another disaster. For example, after 
Hurricane Floyd, people were sceptical about whether their counties' had 
learned anything from the disaster, respondents mentioned that, since the 
flood, counties had not done a good job of keeping drainage ditches free of 
debris and that bridges were not high enough to surmount future flood levels 
(Moore et aI., 2004). Disaster prevention, however, such as relocating and 
redesigning infrastructure, can be influenced by a communities' desire to 
"return to normalcy" as quickly as possible, which does not create a positive 
environment for orderly, well-planned reconstruction processes (Petterson, 
1999). Similarly, recovery planning can become thwarted by old perceptions 
and mental pictures of the community as it was before the disaster 
(Petterson, 1999). Furthermore, in terms of encouraging homeowner 
participation in preventative measures, policies are not well accepted. 
However, respondents in a number of studies have indicated that they 
support citizen involvement in developing fire hazard reduction programs 
(Blanchard & Ryan, 2004), which is important because such programs and 
policies need public input to be able to deal with the realities of public 
expectations as well as the realities of the biophysical environment (Cortner 
et al., 1990). 
Expectation ofthe media 
Prevention and mitigation 
The media has a significant influence on public knowledge, perceptions and 
opinions. Many studies have linked respondent knowledge and perceptions 
of bushfire and opinions of bushfire management with information 
disseminated by the media. For example, Cortner et al. (1990) reported that 
the news media, second to experience, was a way in which people were made 
aware of the bushfire hazard. Jacobson et al. (2001) found that public 
opinion about the benefits of prescribed fire closely. matched the benefits 
identified by the media, and similarly Loomis et al. (2001) suggested that 
media coverage of bushfires in Florida contributed to Florida respondents' 
knowledge and support of prescribed burning. There is also evidence that 
people prefer bushfire information to be delivered via the media; 
respondents in Holden et al. (2000) indicated that television, second to 
literature (e.g., pamphlet, booklet), is the best delivery method for bushfire 
information. However, Monroe and Nelson's (2004) study has suggested 
that the media is not always a trusted source, and indeed in the USA for 
example, there has been cause to distrust the media because of conflicting 
messages (Cortner et al., 1990; Burns et al., 2003). Respondents in Monroe 
and Nelson's study (2004) indicated that written news and televised 
interviews with experts are better trusted. Focus groups discussions in the 
Burns et al. (2003) study revealed that people believe the media should be 
more proactive, not only by providing more accurate and objective 
information but by discussing the complexity of bush fires and the benefits of 
. prescribed burning, and explaining "why" mitigation action should be taken, 
rather than providing mere informational messages. "The well functioning of 
a modern society is based on the good and fast circulation of information. 
This is even more relevant in the case of a society vulnerable to natural 
hazards" (Anonymous, 1998, p. 21). Information (collection, production and 
dissemination) and communication media are a crucial link in the chain of 
sound prevention measures and awareness-raising (Anonymous, 1998). 
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Response and recovery 
In a bushfire event people rely heavily on and need information to make 
effective decisions, and although emergency services remajn responsible for 
the communication of risk (Krusel & Petris, 1992), the media plays a crucial 
role. Often the media is the only potential source of information during a 
fire. From Lazarus and Alley's (1984) study, it appears that many people 
during the Ash Wednesday fires could not use phones, lived a significant 
distance from neighbours and/or had no contact with emergency services, 
however, they did have access to a radio and/or television but there were 
reports that the media did not provide adequate information. As a likely 
consequence, some of these people did not know the fire was in their area 
until it reached their house. There are a number of reports suggesting that 
the media could have done a better job of warning people of an impending 
hazard (Moore et al., 2004). Furthermore, Odgers and Rhodes' (2002) study 
suggested that people would like the media to provide more specific 
information during a fire event, such as the location, severity and direction of 
the bushfire. 
The media can also influence the recovery cycle of a community after a 
disaster. For example, the 2002 Rodeo-Chediski fire in northern Arizona 
highlighted the influence of media coverage during and after the fires on the 
magnitude of recovery assistance received by a community. One community, 
of three affected by the fire, received the most media coverage and as a result 
received the most help offers from ordinary people and helping organisations 
wanting to contribute money and other resources to ajd in recovery. This 
inequity contributed to the tension and conflict observed in the aftermath 
(Carroll et al., 2005). 
Expectation of insurance agencies 
Insurance agencies are obviously depended on for money to rebuild homes, 
however, often a person's insurance policy does not cover 100% of the loss, 
which is commonly unexpected because people may not realise that they live 
in a fire-prone area or forget to update their policy, for example. However, 
there are also unanticipated disputes between fire victims and their insurers. 
For example, in the aftermath of the Canberra fires a woman claimed that 
her insurance agency was unreasonable in offering to pay ouly two-thirds of 
her home insurance, because it did not cover the concrete slab, which had 
been compromised according to an engineer, and the assessment excluded 
part of the house (Morris, 2002). Although it is primarily the responsibility 
of the person buying insurance, there is a need for insurance agencies to 
undertake an awareness rajsing role concerning people's insurance policies, 
which, if effective, would lessen the financial repercussions. 
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Cortner et al. (1990) revealed that people in a fire-affected community who 
did not update their policies were provided an economic advantage because 
they were able to apply for a low interest loan, which effectively provided the 
resources to rebuild bigger and better homes than their neighbours who had 
updated their policies. There is also perhaps a need for insurance agencies to 
playa role in promoting homeowner bushfire preparedness, via mechanisms 
such as a reduction in home insurance premiums if a house is constructed of 
fire resistant materials, as was suggested by a respondent in Winter and 
Fried's (2000) study. 
Conclusion 
This review of community expectations of bushfires and the impact of 
bushfires on communities shows quite clearly that there are considerable 
differences between and within communities in terms of bushfire awareness, 
perceptions of bush fires, expectations of what happens during a bushfire, the 
iropact on individuals and communities, and expectations of the roles of 
various organisations. The implications of this are substantive and fraught 
with difficulties for service delivery and applied social research. Locality 
clearly remains important and it often falls to the local service providers to 
understand the expectations and beliefs held by the communities they serve. 
There is a clear need to identify effective strategies for service providers to 
understand and engage with their communities. The challenge for applied 
social researchers is to identify and develop appropriate strategies or models 
for engagement. 
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